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1. A Conflict in the Republic
At the end of Republic I Socrates persuades Thrasymachus that the
just and virtuous person will do well, live well and be happy
(353e4-354a4). Socrates at once admits that the conclusion is pre-
mature, and that he ought to have examined the nature of justice
before deciding whether or not the just person is happy (354bl-c3).
The rest of the Republic might seem to promise a fuller defense
of Socrates' claim that justice secures happiness. For Glaucon and
Adeimantus claim to "renew the argument of Thrasymachus"
(358b7-cl), with a better statement of his objections to justice; and
we expect them to ask Socrates for a better defense of the thesis
maintained against Thrasymachus.
We do not get what we expect. Glaucon and Adeimantus do not
ask Socrates to show that justice by itself makes the just person happy.
They ask him to show that justice by itself makes the just person
happier than the unjust (361c3-d3). And it is this comparative claim
that Socrates defends in the main argument of the Republic, in Books
II-IX.
The thesis of Book I and the thesis of II-IX are vitally different.
For the second thesis leaves open a possibility that the first thesis
excludes. It is possible for A to be happier than B even though
neither A nor B is happy; and so when Plato argues that the just
person is in all circumstances happier than the unjust, he does not
imply that the just person is happy in all circumstances.' He allows
' I translate ev8ai.fiovia by "happiness." This use of the comparative marks one
difference between eidainwv and the English "happy"; the comparative suggests that
fuSaifjMv has the logic of "straight" and (significantly) of "complete."
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that happiness may have components that are not infallibly secured
by justice. Though the second thesis is hard to believe, it is easier
than the first.
Plato probably sees the difference betw^een the two theses. In Book
X he claims that justice leads to happiness because it normally secures
honors, rewards and other external benefits in this life, and invariably
secures the favor of the gods (612a8-614a8). Here Plato assumes
that justice by itself does not secure happiness, and rejects the strong
thesis defended at the end of Book I (the "sufficiency thesis").
Plato has a good reason for making Socrates in Book I defend the
sufficiency thesis. On this point as on others, Book I presents a
Socratic argument for comparison and contrast with the rest of the
Republic. For the early dialogues clearly commit Socrates to the
sufficiency thesis.^ In rejecting it Plato rejects a central element of
Socratic ethics.
In later antiquity the interpretation of Socrates' and Plato's views
about virtue and happiness remained a controversial matter. Chrysip-
pus criticizes Plato for doing away with justice and any other genuine
virtue by recognizing such things as health as goods (Plutarch, De
Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1040d). On the other hand, the later Stoic
Antipater wrote a book arguing that Plato maintained the Stoic thesis
that only the fine is good (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta iii, Antip. 56).
Among later Platonists Plutarch seems to accept Chrysippus' inter-
pretation of Plato, and so finds that Plato and Aristotle agree on this
point against the Stoics. On the other side Atticus asci-ibes to Plato
a view much closer to the Stoic position, and so contrasts him sharply
with Aristotle: "He [sc. Aristotle] deviated from Plato first of all on
the common and greatest and most decisive point, by failing to
observe the measure of happiness and failing to agree that virtue is
self-sufficient for this [sc. measure]" (ap. Eusebius, Praeparatio Evan-
gelica 794c6-d2).^ "While Plato shouted and proclaimed on each
occasion that the most just person is the happiest, Aristotle refused
to allow that happiness follows on virtue unless one is fortunate in
family and physical beauty and other things" (794dl0-13). Here
Atticus assumes unwisely that Plato's acceptance of the comparative
claim commits him to acceptance of the sufficiency thesis.
Albinus is equally unwary; he reasonably finds in the Euthydemus
^ One way to explain the parallels between Rep. I and the Socratic dialogues is
to regard it as a Socratic dialogue. I think this solution is unnecessary, and that some
evidence of self-consciousness in Rep. I suggests that Plato wrote it deliberately as an
introduction to the Republic. See part 1 1 below.
^ Edited by E. H. GifFord (Oxford 1903, 5 vols.). Atticus' views are discussed by
J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London 1977), p. 25.
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a commitment to the Stoic thesis that only the fine is good, but claims
that Plato has demonstrated this most of all in the whole of the
Republic; "for he says that the man with the knowledge we have
mentioned is the most fortunate and happiest," even in adverse
circumstances {Eisagoge 181. 7-9).'* "Most fortunate" is Albinus'
addition to the Republic (perhaps under the influence of Euthydemus
282c9), and he assumes that the Republic's comparative claim is
equivalent to the sufficiency thesis.
This conflict in the interpretation of Plato is implicitly associated
with different views on the relation of Plato to Socrates. It is highly
probable that the Stoics recognized, as Cicero did {Parad. 4), the
Socratic origin of their views on virtue and happiness. The Stoics
are partly inspired by the Cynics, and the Cynics by Socrates. But
Chrysippus' debt to Socrates does not lead him to ascribe the Socratic
view to Plato; nor does his dispute with Plato lead him to ascribe the
Platonic view to Socrates. Chrysippus' care in distinguishing Socrates
from Plato contrasts sharply with Cicero's argument for finding the
Socratic position in Plato; Cicero appeals to the Gorgias and the
Menexenus, raising no question about whether these present Plato's
views {Tusc. V. 35-36).
I want to suggest that Chrysippus is right in his interpretation-of
Plato and right to distinguish Socrates from Plato. But to see why
Plato disagrees with Socrates we must see why Socrates believes the
sufficiency thesis. If we can find his reasons we will perhaps also see
the claims that Plato could not accept.
2. Socrates' Claims
To show that the sufficiency thesis is Socratic we can appeal to earlier
dialogues:
1. In the Apology Socrates affirms that a better person cannot be
harmed by a worse (30c6-d5), and that no evil at all can happen
to a good person, either in life or in death (41c8-d2).
2. In the Crito Socrates affirms an essential premise of his argument
about disobedience and injustice, that living well, living finely and
living justly are the same thing (48b8-9). Since living well is the
same thing as living happily, Socrates assumes that anyone who
lives virtuously (i.e. finely and justly) ensures his happiness.
3. In the Gorgias Socrates argues that the virtuous and just person
acts finely and does well, and thereby is happy (507b8-c7).
* Edited by K. F. Hermann in Platonis Dialogi, vol. 6 (Leipzig 1884). See Dillon,
p. 299.
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4. In the Charmides Socrates asks what sort of knowledge temperance
is. If it is merely the knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, it
will not produce happiness, since only the knowledge of good and
evil will do that (173d3-5, 174bll-c3). It is assumed that the
knowledge of good and evil ensures happiness; and if virtue is
identical to that knowledge, virtue must ensure happiness.
5. The same assumption is made in the Euthydemus. Though we find
it hard to describe the product of the kingly craft, we take it for
granted that there is a craft securing happiness.^
This evidence commits Socrates fairly clearly to the sufficiency
thesis. The first three passages are the clearest. The last two are less
clear; for the crucial assumption appears in an argument that runs
into difficulties, and we might say that Socrates wants to expose the
assumption as a source of the difficulties. But the first three passages
show that he cannot easily reject the assumption.
3. Questions about Happiness
To see why Socrates accepts the sufficiency thesis we must consider
especially his conception of happiness. His views on virtue are com-
paratively clear, since inquiries into the nature of virtue are his main
concern in the early dialogues. It is remarkable, however, that he
never thinks it is worth asking what happiness is. A search for a
definition would apparently be rather useful; but he never seems to
feel the need of it. The Republic displays some of the same insouciance.
At the end of Book I Socrates admits that his conclusion is premature;
he cannot claim to know that justice ensures happiness until he has
said what justice is. But he says nothing similar about happiness; and
the Republic never offers any explicit account of the nature of
happiness.
To see where Socrates and Plato fail we must turn to Aristotle's
discussion of happiness in Eth. Nic. I. Aristotle notices that people all
identify happiness with the highest good, but disagree about what
happiness is (1095a 17-22), and offer different candidates— virtue,
honor, pleasure and so on. But he thinks these disputes are tractable
because we can agree on something intermediate between the very
general claim about the highest good and the disputed claims about
candidates for happiness. His solution of the disputes proceeds through
three stages:
^ Socrates assumes that rJTiq, rinaq oinjaa, 288el-2, is equivalent to rjp JSfi mkttjm^'oi'?
rifwu; eudaifwvaq hpm, 289c7-8; cf. d9-10, 290b 1-2, 291b6, 292b8-cl, e5.
T. H. Irwin 89
1. Formal criteria for the highest good— completeness and self-
sufficiency (1097b20-21).
2. A conception of happiness meeting these criteria— activity of the
soul according to virtue in a complete life (1098a 16- 18).
3. A candidate for the happy life— the life according to the specific
actions and states of character described in the Eth. Nic.
These three stages make disputes more tractable. Even if we do
not initially agree on the successful candidates we can agree on formal
criteria, and use our agreement to form a conception of happiness
that allows us to reduce our initial disagreement about candidates,
by asking if they conform to a conception of happiness that meets
the formal criteria. Aristotle practises this method on the lives of
pleasure, honor and virtue to show that each of them is an unsuccessful
candidate.^
Even this rough idea of Aristotle's method of argument suggests
what is missing in Socrates and Plato.' They offer us many third-
stage remarks, about candidates for happiness. Sometimes they offer
second-stage remarks; Aristotle's argument about the human function
is partly anticipated in Republic I. But they offer no explicit first-stage
remarks to show us the appropriate formal criteria for happiness.*
If, however, we are to understand Socrates' reasons for his third-
stage claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness, we would like to
find the implicit criteria and conception that might support it. We
must ask him Aristotle's questions. Since Socrates does not ask them
himself, we must rely on some inference and speculation to decide
how he probably answers them. I will offer one account of his position,
and try to explain why I think it is preferable to the most plausible
alternative I can think of. But whether or not my account is right, I
** On the role of the formal criteria in this chapter see Nic. Ethics, trans. T. H.
Irwin (Indianapolis 1985), note on 1095b 14 fF.
' Some hints exploited by Aristotle appear in Phil. 20b8-22c4, in terms partly
derived from Rep. 505b5-dl. Helpful remarks on formal criteria: N. P. White,
"Goodness and human aims in Aristotle's ethics," in Studies in Aristotle, ed. D. J.
O'Meara (Washington, D.C. 1981), pp. 225-46, at pp. 231, 234 f.
* I believe that in the Protagoras Socrates is seriously committed to hedonism
(some grounds for this belief are ably urged by J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor,
The Greeks on Pleasure [Oxford 1982], pp. 58-68). It is important to explore the
connections of the view of happiness that I attribute to Socrates with the discussions
of hedonism in the Protagoras and Gorg. But I ignore the Protagoras here, because I
would like my arguments to be independent of the dispute about hedonism, and
because hedonism offers us only a conception of happiness that still leaves us to look
for the criteria that justify it.
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think it draws attention to a series of questions about Socratic ethics
that need closer study.^
4. Criteria for Happiness
When Socrates argues with interlocutors holding common-sense views,
he must begin from these views, and either appeal to them in his
own argument or explain why he rejects them. In the earlier dialogues
Socrates does not always show that he sees how controversial some
of his claims are. The Socratic Paradox, e.g., is taken for granted in
the Laches, but defended only in the Protagoras and Meno.^^ Similarly,
the sufficiency thesis is assumed in several dialogues; but only the
Gorgias indicates that Socrates thinks it is paradoxical (470c-e), and
only the Euthydemus defends it. We should not assume either that
Socrates (or Plato) must have had a clear defense in mind when he
first put forward the thesis or that the defense must have come later
than the first statement of the thesis. If we attend to the Gorgias and
Euthydemus, we can see that at least sometimes Socrates both sees
that the thesis needs defense and defends it. He would be unwise to
assume his view without argument; common beliefs about happiness
and virtue do not make the sufficiency thesis seem obviously true.
We should therefore see how Socrates might argue from common
beliefs to show that his interlocutor must accept the sufficiency thesis.
The Euthydemus is our best source for such an argument, but it
fails us at one essential point. Socrates does not begin with a statement
of the criteria and conception he accepts in his claims about happiness.
To see how the argument works, however, we must try to see his
criteria and conception.
He begins with an assumption that he takes to be uncontroversial,
that happiness is what we all want (278b3-6)." We achieve happiness
by gaining many goods (279a 1-4), and Socrates' list of goods is also
meant to be largely uncontroversial (279a4-7). The reputed goods
include bodily and social advantages, possessions and good fortune
^ My treatment of Socrates' views on happiness in Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford
1977) is open to criticism for not having faced these questions. It is justly criticized
by Gregory Vlastos, "Happiness and Virtue in Socrates' Moral Theory," Proceedings
of the Cambridge Philological Society NS 30 (1984), 181-213, at p. 207 note 54, and by
D. J. Zeyl, "Socratic Virtue and Happiness," Archiv fur Gesch. der Phil. 14 (1982), pp.
225-38. In this paper I don't defend the claim that Socrates does take virtue to be
merely instrumental to happiness and not an intrinsic good, but the weaker claim
that the sufficiency thesis is compatible with the purely instrumentalist conception of
virtue. (See Part 9, last paragraph.)
'" See Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, p. 72.
" Socrates identifies iv irparTew with evdainovtw, 280b6.
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(279a4-c8); Socrates recognizes some room for dispute about the
virtues and wisdom, but includes them too (279b4-c2).
To see the point of this list of goods we can usefully turn to
Aristotle. In Rhetoric I. 5 he presents "by way of illustration . . . what
happiness is, to speak in general terms, and from what things its parts
[sc. come about]" (1 360b7-9). He offers something closer to common-
sense views than he offers in the Ethics, where his views on the right
formal criteria and conception influence his presentation of common
sense; and for our purposes the less sophisticated account in the
Rhetoric is especially useful. To show what happiness is Aristotle offers
four answers. It is "(1) doing well together with virtue, or (2) self-
sufficiency of life, or (3) the pleasantest life together with safety, or
(4) prosperity of possessions and bodies together with the power to
protect them and act with them; for practically everyone agrees that
happiness is one or more of these things" (1360b 14- 18). After
presenting these conceptions of happiness Aristotle offers a list of its
parts, rather similar to the list of reputed goods in the Euthydemus.
He explains why they seem to be parts: 'Tor in this way someone
would be most self-sufficient, by having both the internal and external
goods, since there are no other goods beside these. . . . Further, we
think it proper for him to have power and fortune, since that will
make his life most secure" (1360b24-29).
Aristotle suggests that the reputed goods are plausibly taken to be
parts of happiness because they make someone self-sufficient; he has
all the goods he could want, and needs none to be added. He is
secure in so far as his good fortune protects him against sudden
reversals and loss of happiness. Self-sufficiency and security are
plausible formal criteria for happiness (1360b 14- 18), and they justify
the common conception of happiness as consisting in the possession
of all the goods there are.
In the Euthydemus Socrates' attitude to the popular candidates for
happiness is far more critical than Aristotle's. He agrees with the
popular view that it must include all the goods there are; but he
claims that wisdom is the only good, and is therefore necessary and
sufficient for happiness. To see if Socrates is right we should appeal
to the formal criterion assumed by the popular candidates. If Socrates
cannot show that his candidate for happiness achieves self-sufficiency
and security, then he violates an apparently reasonable formal criterion
for happiness. He must either challenge this criterion or show that
his own candidate for happiness satisfies it.
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5. Socrates' Argument
Socrates argues for the conclusion that wisdom is the only good and
makes a person happy. We have every reason to suppose that he takes
the conclusion seriously; for he identifies virtue with wisdom, and
we have seen that he takes virtue to be sufficient for happiness. To
justify his conviction about happiness he needs to show that there is
no genuine part of happiness that is not secured by virtue, and that
therefore the reputed goods that are independent of virtue are not
elements of happiness at all. (Let us call these "external goods,"
remembering that in Socrates' final view they are really not goods
at all.)
But though the conclusion is important the argument raises grave
doubts; its faults seem to be recurrent, gross and obvious.
Socrates rejects the external goods in two stages. First he argues
that good fortune is not an element of happiness that is independent
of wisdom, because wisdom by itself secures all the good fortune that
is needed (279c9-280a8). Next he argues that none of the external
goods is a good at all, because it is their right use that secures
happiness, and only wisdom ensures their right use (280bl-281e5).'^
First Socrates considers good fortune. He mentions two types of
crafts:
(a) flute-playing, writing and reading;
(b) generalship, navigation and medicine (279d8-280a4).
Though he does not mention it, a difference between (a) and (b) is
fairly clear; the Stoics, following Aristotle, formulate it as the differ-
ence between stochastic and non-stochastic crafts {Stoicorum Veterum
Fragmenta III. 19). In (a) fortune seems to be needed to prevent
antecedent ill fortune. An expert writer cannot produce good writing
without the appropriate material; and we may think that the supply
of it is sometimes a matter of fortune. But once he has it, the
'^ In examining reputed goods Socrates does not distinguish instrumental from
intrinsic goods. Indeed he does not describe evbainovia or ev irpctTTiiv as an ayadbv at
all in the Euthyd.; and it might be argued that here he confines ayada to instrumental
goods. The same is true oi Gorgias 467c-468e. Sometimes ayaBa may seem to include
intrinsic goods, Gorgias 494e9-495b4, 499e5, Protagoras 355c3-8 (contrast Gorgias
496b5-6). But this is not certain; I can see no clear reason for denying that, e.g.,
the pleasures mentioned in these passages are considered as goods because they are
instrumental to happiness. If this is so, then the claim in Rep. 357b5 that some goods
are goods because they are chosen for their own sak.es reflects a departure from the
Socratic conception of goods. The claim that happiness is not a good is not
unparalleled; Aristippus (Diog. L. II. 87) may be exploiting a Socratic distinction to
draw an un-Socratic conclusion.
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competent exercise of his craft ensures the right result. In the crafts
listed in (b) fortune also seems to be needed to prevent subsequent
ill fortune. A pilot might exercise his craft quite competently with
the right material, but still a sudden and unpredictable storm might
sink the ship.
Keeping in mind these two areas of ill fortune we can examine
Socrates' argument. He wants to show that good fortune need not
be added to our list of goods once we include wisdom, since wisdom
ensures the sort of success for which we wrongly think good fortune
is needed. He argues:
1. In each case the wise person has better fortune than the unwise
(280a4-5).
2. Genuine wisdom can never go wrong, but must always succeed
(280a7-8).
3. Therefore wisdom always makes us fortunate (280a6).
In this argument Socrates seems to move without warrant to
steadily stronger claims. Since (3) is supposed to eliminate good
fortune as a distinct good apart from wisdom, Socrates should show
that wisdom provides all the success that is normally taken to require
good fortune. But all he shows in (1) is that wisdom ensures mpre
success, other things being equal, than we can expect if we lack it.
The claim in (2) seems stronger. Socrates seems to ignore the problem
of antecedent ill fortune with both types of crafts; and even if this
point is waived, he seems to ignore subsequent ill fortune in crafts
of the second type. We might agree with Socrates that bad writing
with a good pen on good paper indicates lack of the writer's craft;
but we need not see any lack of craft in a pilot's failure to save his
ship from an unpredictable storm. It is just this sort of failure that
we avoid only if we have good fortune. These objections seem to
show that Socrates is not entitled to (2), if it is understood in a strong
enough sense to imply (3). Apparently, then, Socrates tries to prove
that good fortune, as an external good distinct from wisdom, is
unnecessary for happiness, but in trying to prove this ignores those
very cases that seem to show why we need good fortune.
Socrates now argues that the other external goods are not really
goods; and he needs to show this, since these external goods seem
to depend at least partly on good fortune, which Socrates has just
argued is unnecessary for happiness. In Socrates' view, the only real
good is wisdom, and so this turns out to be the only good that we
need for happiness. He argues:
1. It is possible to use the external goods well or badly (280b7-c3,
d7-281al).
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2. Correct use of them is necessary and sufficient for happiness
(280d7-281el).
3. Wisdom is necessary and sufficient for correct use (281al-b2).
4. Therefore wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness
(28Ib2-4).
This is the conclusion that Socrates needs. But he strengthens it by
a further defense of (1) and (2):
5. Each external good used without wisdom is a greater evil than its
opposite, and each used by wisdom is a greater good than its
opposite (281d6-8).
6. Therefore each external good and evil is in fact neither good nor
evil (281e3-4).
7. Therefore wisdom is the only good and folly the only evil (281e4-5).
At (3) and (4) two possibilities need to be considered:
(a) Given a reasonable supply of external goods, wisdom is necessary
and sufficient for happiness.
(b) Whatever external goods we may have or lack, wisdom is necessary
and sufficient for happiness.
In his examples Socrates considers only cases that allow (a); he remarks
that a supply of money and other external resources is still liable to
misuse. He might say that wisdom guarantees the right use, not the
initial resources; then he would have to concede the role of antecedent
fortune, and would simply be ignoring the role of subsequent fortune
in the exercise of some crafts. But if he concedes the role of antecedent
fortune, he cannot maintain his claim to have eliminated fortune as
a distinct contributor to happiness. The elimination of fortune re-
quires the strong claim in (b). And for this strong claim Socrates
seems to have given no sufficient argument.
A further question arises in (5)-(7). When Socrates says in (5) that
health, for example, is a greater good than sickness if it is guided by
wisdom, we might suppose he means that health, in these circum-
stances, is a good and otherwise is not. In that case Socrates can
deny, as he does in (6), that health taken by itself {avrb de Kad' avro)
is a good, and allow that it is a good when it is guided by wisdom.
But if that is what (6) means, the transition to (7) is blatantly
unwarranted, since (7) says that health is not a good at all.
We have two ways out of this unwelcome result:
(a) In (7) Socrates only means that health is not a good by itself, and
needs wisdom added if it is to be a good.
(b) In (5) he does not mean that health is a good.
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While (a) might seem to be a more reasonable conclusion, it would
not fulfill Socrates' main aim in the whole argument; for the reasons
we have already seen, he must show that wisdom is necessary and
sufficient for happiness, and hence the only real good.
If we look again at (5), we can see that Socrates is not committed
to regarding health as a good. If we adapt his remarks to show that
health is a greater good, we will say: if wisdom leads health, health
will be a greater good than sickness to the extent that it is more able
to serve its leader when the leader is good (cf. 281d6-7). This account
of how health is a greater good does not imply that health is good;
"greater good" may simply mean "more of a good," that is, "closer
to being a good." The explanation in "to the extent . . ." says that
health is more able to serve wisdom. If a wise person wants to act
he will often find it easier to act as he wants to if he is healthy than
if he is sick.'^ Socrates, then, can consistently claim that health is not
a good. But he surely has not justified this claim, or the sufficiency
thesis; for he has not shown that virtue can do without a level of
health that is not within its control.
After finding such serious flaws in this argument in the Euthydemus
we might remind ourselves that the dialogue as a whole is concerned
with eristic, and suggest that even the protreptic passages are not
free of the fallacious argument that is rife in the rest of the dialogue.
But if we dismiss the argument we will have dismissed our best
evidence of Socrates' defense of the sufficiency thesis. Before we
dismiss it we ought to see if Socrates can reasonably appeal to
assumptions about happiness that make some of his moves less clearly
illegitimate.
At this point we need to examine Socrates' criteria and conception
more closely. For our previous objections will collapse if Socrates can
justify two claims:
1. When we plan for happiness, we can always count on having the
right material, so that antecedent ill fortune can be ignored.
2. Happiness is the sort of end that is infallibly secured by the correct
exercise of wisdom.
To justify these two claims Socrates needs to show that he can
defend them from a conception of happiness that satisfies reasonable
formal criteria. If we return to Aristotle's general account of happiness
Socrates seems to be wrong; for the completeness, self-sufficiency and
'^ In Meno 88c6-dl Socrates concedes that external goods are in some circum-
stances actually beneficial. His claim here is different from the one in the Euthyd.,
though either claim is consistent with his main claims about virtue and happiness.
See Part 10 below.
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security of happiness seem to require just those goods that are exposed
to antecedent and subsequent ill fortune. Socrates needs to show that
he need not accept these inferences from the formal criteria.
6. Happiness and Desire
Aristotle takes happiness to be the self-sufficient and secure life. He
assumes that self-sufficiency and completeness imply each other; for
the list of reputed goods achieves self-sufficiency because it includes
all the goods there are (1360b26).
But how is completeness to be achieved? Both Socrates and Aristotle
assume, first, that happiness is what we all want, and, second, that
whatever else we want we want for the sake of happiness {Euthydemus
278e3-279a4).''' If we are concerned with happiness because it is
what we want, it will be complete in so far as it achieves all we want,
and self-sufficient if it lacks nothing that we need to achieve all our
desires. Aristotle sometimes explains the completeness of happiness
in this way, saying that it is what we must attain to fulfill our desire
{Eth. End. 1215b 17-18).'^
If we accept this account of completeness and self-sufficiency, the
formal criterion of happiness seems to explain why we need the
external goods, and why the loss of them will prevent happiness. If
1 lack the resources to satisfy my desires, or ill-fortune interferes with
their execution, I lose happiness because I have my desires frustrated.
The elements of my happiness, on this view, must include all that I
need for the satisfaction of my desires; and hence they must include
the external goods.
This conclusion, however, is open to challenge, for a reason that
is briefly stated by Hume. Hume denies that the failure of metaphysical
ambitions is a ground for unhappiness or discontent: 'Tor nothing
is more certain than that despair has almost the same effect upon us
with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the
impossibility of satisfying a desire, than the desire itself vanishes"
{Treatise, Introd.). Hume draws our attention to a familiar fact, that
we do not necessarily think ourselves unhappy simply because we
'^ The second assumption is not explicit in the Euthyd.; but no other object of
wish (ffovXofieda, 278e3) and no other basis for choice than happiness is mentioned.
Here, in apparent contrast to Gorgias 467c fF., ayaOa are not said to be objects of
/SouXtjctk;.
'' This is not a complete or fair account of Aristotle's conditions for happiness.
(This passage, e.g., raises a question about the relation between being aiptrbv and
filling desire.) But the fact that he speaks in these terms about happiness shows how
someone might interpret the demand for completeness.
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cannot fulfill clearly unfeasible desires that we might have had or
once did have. When we see that a desire is unfeasible we give it up,
and once we have given it up, we no longer suffer the unhappiness
of frustrated desire.
If we attend to Hume's point we can reply to the claim that
external goods must be elements of happiness. The loss of these
goods seems to cause unhappiness because it makes some of our
desires unfeasible, and it will cause unhappiness if we retain the
unfeasible desires. But the rational person will react by giving up the
desires that have become unfeasible; once he has given them up, he
is no longer unhappy because they are unsatisfied. The loss of external
goods seems to cause no loss of happiness, and the external goods
are therefore not necessary for happiness.
In reply to Socrates we might urge that Hume is not right about
every case; even if we realize a desire is unfeasible and that we would
be better off if we gave it up, we may retain it, and so continue to
suffer the unhappiness resulting from its frustration. While this might
be a fair objection to Hume, Socrates can hardly accept it. Since he
accepts the Socratic Paradox, he believes that everyone's desires are
all concentrated on his own happiness and the means to it; as soon
as we see that an action does not promote our happiness we will lose
the desire to do it. Socrates' moral psychology offers him a strong
defense of Hume's claim.
Just as the loss of external goods does not by itself cause unhap-
piness, their presence does not by itself secure happiness. We can still
misuse them; and however many we have, we may have such extrav-
agant and unfeasible desires that we are still unsatisfied. In favorable
conditions as, well as unfavorable we need feasible desires; and once
we have them, we can secure happiness through the fulfillment of
our desires.
We have seen, then, why external goods are neither necessary nor
sufficient for happiness; and at the same time we have seen why the
appropriate sort of wisdom will secure happiness. A wise person will
see that he is better off with feasible desires; and if changing external
conditions make some of his desires unfeasible, he will give them up.
By adapting his desires to suit the external conditions, he will secure
his happiness whatever the conditions may be.
A wise person is indifferent to external goods in so far as he does
not regret their loss, and sees that they are neither necessary nor
sufficient for his happiness. But he does not ignore them altogether.
For they are means to the satisfaction of some desires he has. If the
wise person wants a Rolls-Royce, and has the money to buy it, the
money will help him to satisfy his desires, and for that it will be
98 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
useful to him. But if he loses the money, he will not suffer a loss of
happiness, since he will adapt his desires to suit his reduced resources.
We have traced a conception of happiness that accepts the Aris-
totelian formal criteria, and interprets them in a particular way that
leads to a non-Aristotelian conclusion, that external goods are not
elements of happiness, and so are not genuine goods. Aristotle leaves
himself exposed to this sort of argument as soon as he identifies
completeness and self-sufficiency with the complete fulfillment of
desires; for then it seems quite reasonable to adapt our desires in
ways that secure their satisfaction.
On further consideration we may even think the formal criteria
demand the adaptive strategy. For Aristotle recognizes security as a
formal criterion of happiness; and security seems to him to require
a reasonable supply of external goods, which in turn requires good
fortune. We might challenge Aristotle's inference and claim that only
an adaptive strategy properly fulfills his formal criterion. For the
happiness of a wise and well-adapted person seems far more secure
than the condition of someone who depends on the continuation of
good fortune; dependence on external conditions makes our well-
being insecure; and such an insecure condition can hardly count as
happiness. From the formal criteria of happiness we have reached a
conception of happiness as the complete fulfilment of desire, and an
adaptive strategy for achieving that fulfilment. Let us call this an
adaptive account of happiness; we have seen why it presents a plausible
challenge to the common-sense view that regards external goods as
elements of happiness.
7. Socrates' Account of Happiness
I have sketched an adaptive account of happiness to show how it can
plausibly be derived from the common-sense criteria presented by
Aristotle. I now suggest that this sort of account is presupposed in
the Euthydemus. If Socrates relies on an adaptive account of happiness,
he can answer our previous objections relying on external circum-
stances. He is free to ignore antecedent fortune; for the wise person
needs no particular external goods, but only needs to find the desires
that are feasible in the circumstances. If he suffers subsequent ill
fortune, that will not threaten his happiness either; he will simply
have discovered that some of his desires are unfeasible, and so will
eliminate them. Socrates can justifiably claim that wisdom by itself
secures all the good fortune that is needed for happiness, and that
while favorable conditions (e.g. being healthy rather than sick) make
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it easier to fulfill the desires I have, they are unnecessary for happiness
and do not contribute to it in their own right.
If an adaptive account of happiness allows this defense of Socrates'
argument, we have some reason to suppose he accepts or presupposes
it. This is not a decisive reason; we may be able to find other accounts
of happiness that explain this argument as well or better. To explain
the argument we should both be able to refer to formal criteria for
happiness that Socrates might be expected to assume, and be able to
answer the objections that arise at different stages in Socrates'
argument. I cannot think of any other account of happiness that will
pass these tests as well as the adaptive account passes them; and
therefore I am inclined to attribute the adaptive account to Socrates.
The implicit presence of an adaptive account in the Euthydernus is
one reason for ascribing it to Socrates. But clearly we will have much
better reasons if we can find other evidence to support us, and we
will have to think again if we find conflicting evidence in other
dialogues.
One argument in the Lysis assumes that the good person, as such,
is sufficient for himself and to that extent needs nothing else (215a6-8).
This assumption is not clearly challenged in the dialogue; and we
can see why Socrates accepts it if he believes that happiness is complete
satisfaction and accepts the sufficiency thesis.
In the Apology Socrates suggests that death is a good thing even if
it is like a permanent sleep (40a9-e4). There are few days or nights
in our lives in which we have lived better or more pleasantly than in
the nights of dreamless sleep (40d2-e2). Though Socrates first assumes
that death involves non-existence (40c6), his praise of death does not
rest on this assumption; and so he forgoes the Epicurean argument
that nothing bad can happen to us when we do not exist and are
unaware of anything."^ His argument is a different one— that death
is actually good for us because it is so similar to a condition that is
evidently better and pleasanter than most others. This claim is
intelligible if an adaptive account of happiness is assumed; for in
dreamless sleep we have no unsatisfied desires. The more seriously
we take this account of happiness, the more seriously we will take
Socrates' praise of death.
In the Gorgias Callicles claims that happiness requires large and
demanding appetites and their satisfaction (491e5-492c8). Socrates
asks him to consider the view that "those who need nothing are
'" 14. This passage is, quite reasonably, adapted to Epicurean use and strangely
conflated with some of the dualism of the Ale. in Ax. 365d-366a. See D. J. Furley,
"Nothing to us?" in The Norms of Nature, edd. M. Schofield and G. Striker (Cambridge
1986).
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happy" (492e3-4)." Callicles rejects this view because it would imply
that rocks and corpses are happiest of all (492e5-6). Since Socrates
has just suggested that a wise person will be temperate and self-
controlled, the conception of happiness that Callicles rejects is plainly
the Socratic conception.
Socrates says he wants to "persuade you to change your mind and
to choose, instead of the unfilled and unrestrained life, the life that
is orderly and adequately supplied and satisfied with the things that
are present on each occasion. But do I persuade you at all actually
to change your mind (and agree) that the orderly people are happier
than the unrestrained?" (493c4-d2). In this last sentence we might
take Socrates to be defending only a comparative claim (cf. 494a2-5),
so that he is not committed to the stronger claim that the self-
sufficient people are actually happy. The merely comparative claim,
however, is not enough for the Gorgias. Socrates has already asserted
the sufficiency thesis against Polus (470e9-10), and he reasserts this
claim against Callicles (507b8-c4).'^ If he maintains the adaptive
account of happiness, his argument is clear. For he takes virtue to
result from temperance, and therefore to result from wise planning
that removes demanding and extravagant desires (503c4-6). An
adaptive account of happiness strongly supports the sufficiency thesis;
without such an account the thesis is left with very weak support.
Here as in the Euthydemus we ascribe the adaptive account to
Socrates because he needs it; and such an argument is less than
conclusive. We are better off^in the Gorgias, however; for here Socrates
mentions an adaptive account of happiness, and closely links it to his
claims about virtue and happiness. It is striking that in the Gorgias
he fails to distinguish the sufficiency thesis from the comparative
thesis that is defended in the Republic; and the dialogue offers only
the adaptive account to support the sufficiency thesis.
These remarks in dialogues apart from the Euthydemus encourage
us to believe that an adaptive account of happiness is not confined
to this one dialogue. Indeed they suggest that whenever Socrates
" Here bdadai includes both wanting and needing. We might think, it is important
to distinguish the two, to insist that someone who does not want anything may still
need some things, and to urge that only not needing anything is a reasonable condition
for the self-sufficiency that is relevant to happiness. But for Socrates the distinction
will be unimportant, since what we need for happiness is just what we need for the
complete satisfaction of our desires; when we have no unsatisfied desires, then, in
his view, we will need nothing.
'*
I doubt if Socrates or Plato is (as often alleged) either confused by or deliberately
exploiting any ambiguity in eS KparTtiv. See Plato: Gorgias, tr. Irwin (Oxford 1979),
p. 223.
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appeals to a conception of happiness to support his argument, he
appeals to a conception that finds happiness in the complete satisfac-
tion of desire. An adaptive account of happiness is an important,
though largely implicit, element of Socratic doctrine.
I have suggested that the claims made in the Euthydemus about
external goods are properly explained by the adaptive account of
happiness accepted in the Gorgias. It is worth remarking, then, that
this connection between the two dialogues may have occurred to the
author of the pseudo-Platonic Eryxias. The argument here asks
whether such external goods as wealth are really goods or really
useful. The argument in the Euthydemus is used to show that these
goods are not always beneficial (403a2-c5). Later Socrates claims
that the happier and better person is the one who requires fewer
external goods (405b8-c6). Just as the healthy person is better off
and needs less than the sick person, so the person with fewer desires
is better off than the person with many desires who needs large
resources to satisfy them (405c6-406a3).
This argument fills the gap left in the Euthydemus, by explaining
why the wise person, who knows how to use external goods and
therefore will make the best use of those he has, will also be successful
and happy, no matter how few of them he has. Part of his wisdom is
his knowledge that he does not need any particular level of them to
secure his happiness, and that he secures his happiness by satisfying
the desires that fit the external goods available to him.
We do not know who wrote the Eryxias or when. But it is worth
mentioning for our purposes, since the author echoes both the
Euthydemus and the Gorgias, and sees how they might be combined.
I think the connections he finds reflect an important Socratic as-
sumption. It is easy to suppose that the Eryxias reflects the influence
of Cynic and Stoic arguments. But we need not assume this; it is an
intelligible, and to this extent not unintelligent, development of
Socratic views.
8. Interpretations of Socratic Happiness
If Socrates accepts an adaptive account of happiness, we can perhaps
understand better why he does not inquire curiously into the nature
of happiness. He realizes that his views about virtue and knowledge
and their relation to happiness are controversial; but he might well
believe that a conception of happiness as completely satisfied desire
is fairly uncontroversial, and that an adaptive strategy is a reasonable
conclusion from it. We can support Socrates by noticing that these
claims might not seem bizarre to all his contemporaries.
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The Menexenus recognizes self-sufficiency as a source of happiness.
A person's happiness is most secure if the things that promote it
depend on himself rather than on the good or bad fortune of others;
and such self-sufficiency is the mark of the temperate, brave and wise
person (247e5-248a7). I mention this passage not because I imagine
that this funeral speech is meant to express distinctively Socratic
doctrine, but for just the opposite reason. Such a remark in a speech
consisting mostly of moral platitudes suggests that an adaptive account
of happiness would not be bizarre and unintelligible (even if it was
not immediately obvious) to someone with ordinary views about
happiness. This is not to say that Socratic ethics is free of paradox;
it certainly outrages common sense at some points, but its aims are
not alien to common sense.
Some of Democritus' remarks on happiness suggest that one of
Socrates' contemporaries could accept an adaptive account. He says:
"If you do not desire much, a little will seem much to you; for a
small desire makes poverty equipollent with wealth" (B 284). For
similar reasons he advises us to "keep our minds fixed on what is
possible, and be satisfied with what is present" (B 191, DK p. 184.
9-10; cf. Gorg. 493c6-7). The claim about equipollence is just what
Socrates needs to explain why recognized goods are not really goods,
and why their loss is not really a harm; if I reduce my desires I will
no longer miss the wealth I have lost, and my reduced resources will
serve me just as well.'^
Democritus' advice makes it easy to infer that an adaptive account
of happiness will also be ascetic, advising us to reduce our desires to
the minimum. Xenophon associates self-sufficiency and requiring
nothing with Socratic asceticism (Mem. I. 2. 14, 6. 10). In fact,
however, the connection between an adaptive account and asceticism
is not simple. If asceticism requires the actual cultivation of limited
and undemanding desires in all conditions, it does not follow from
'' This apparent evidence of a contemporary view may be challenged; see Z.
Stewart, "Democritus and the Cynics," Harx'ard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958),
179-91. It is one of the fragments derived from Stobaeus, and sometimes taken to
be contaminated by Cynicism. At the same time this claim fits well with Democritus'
belief in the unimportance of fortune and the importance of wisdom and one's own
efforts; cf. B 119 and the well-attested B 3. The occurrence of the term "equipollent,"
Caoadtvia, otherwise attested only in later Greek, may provoke doubts, but perhaps
should not. It is a technical term of Skeptical argument (though this is not its only
use); but this may be an example of a Skeptical term introduced by Democritus. For
another example of such a term see P. De Lacey "oi) fiaXKov and the antecedents of
ancient Scepticism," Phronesis 3 (1958), 59-71. The appeal to equipollence may indeed
be connected with the use of ov fiaXXou, since both can be connected with a doctrine
of indifferents; see, e.g., Sextus, Pyrr. Hyp. III. 177 (cited by De Lacey, n. 19).
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an adaptive account of happiness. If I can easily afford a steak and
would prefer it over a bowl of porridge, an adaptive account of
happiness does not require me to prefer the porridge; it simply
requires me to give up the desire for steak if I cannot satisfy it. Still,
we can see why in some conditions Socratic adaptiveness might require
the actions that would be required by Cynic asceticism. We might,
therefore, both deny that Socrates is a Cynic ascetic and suggest that
his adaptive account of happiness made it easy to regard him as an
ascetic.
The Cynic and ascetic interpretation of Socrates' views on happiness
provoked a reaction. As Augustine remarked, the unclarity of Soc-
rates' views encouraged disagreement among professed Socratics.^"
Augustine was reasonably puzzled that the anti-hedonist Cynics and
the hedonist Cyrenaics could both claim to be Socratics.^' But the
dispute is intelligible if Socrates accepts an adaptive account. For
while the Cynics interpret this ascetically, Aristippus points out that
self-sufficiency and independence does not require abstention from
pleasures when they are available. Like Socrates' temperate person
who is satisfied with "the things present on each occasion" {Gorg.
493c6-7; cf. Democ. B 191), he "enjoyed the pleasure of things
present, but did not labor in pursuing enjoyment of things not
present" (Diog. L. II. 66).^^ While Aristippus' version of hedonism
would have surprised Socrates, he legitimately rejects the ascetic
inferences drawn from Socrates' claims about happiness and self-
sufficiency.
The philosopher who agrees most closely with Socrates on this
issue is probably neither Antisthenes nor Aristippus, but Epicurus. I
am not concerned here with Epicurus' hedonism, but with the account
of happiness that forms his particular version of hedonism. Epicurus
clearly accepts an adaptive account of happiness, and therefore
cultivates independence of external conditions: "We count self-suffi-
ciency as a great good, not so that in all circumstances we will use
only a few things, but so that a few things will suffice us if we do not
^^
"Quod [sc. summum bonum] in Socraticis disputationibus, dum omnia movet,
adserit, destruit, quoniam non evidenter apparuit, quod cuique placuit inde sumserunt
et ubi cuique visum esse constituerunt finem boni" (Cm Dei VIII. 3).
^'
"Sic autem diversas inter se Socratici de isto fine sententias habuerunt ut (quod
vix credibile est unius magistri potuisse facere sectatores) quidam summum bonum
esse dicerent voluptatem, sicut Aristippus; quidam virtutem, sicut Antisthenes" {loc.
cit.; cf. XVIII. 41).
^^ Probably the force of irapovruv is partly temporal, reflecting Aristippus' views
about prudence and the future. But it should also refer to Socrates' and Democritus'
use of the term, for what is available and feasible.
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have many, genuinely convinced that those v^ho enjoy luxury most
pleasantly are those who need it least" (Diog. L. X. 130).^^ Epicurus'
advice sounds quite similar to Democritus'; but, unlike Democritus,
he sharply rejects the ascetic inference supporting Cynicism. At the
same time he clarifies Socrates' claim about self-sufficiency. Socrates
left himself open to Cynic and Cyrenaic constructions, but committed
himself to neither.^^ Epicurus best appreciates the role of an adaptive
account in Socrates, and its consequences for the wise person's attitude
to exteral circumstances. As we will see, the Epicurean position also
captures some of Socrates' claims about the virtues, and reflects some
of the difficulties in them.
9. The Sufficiency of Virtue
We turned to the Euthydemus to understand the account of happiness
that is assumed in the sufficiency thesis. Having seen how Socrates
conceives happiness we can now return to this thesis.
Socrates needs to connect wisdom with virtue. We have seen why
knowledge of good and evil will be sufficient for happiness, if an
adaptive account of happiness is accepted. For the wise person will
be the one who knows that an adaptive strategy secures happiness;
and this wisdom will secure his happiness. If we agree with Socrates
in identifying virtue with the knowledge of good and evil, it follows
that virtue is sufficient for happiness.
But we may still wonder how this conception of virtue is connected
with the particular sorts of actions and states of character that both
common sense and Socrates count as virtuous. Can Socrates explain
why the wise person will characteristically be unafraid in battle,
moderate in his appetites and demands, and unwilling to cheat or
steal?
We can see the main line of argument if we consider why someone
might be attracted to intemperate, cowardly or unjust action. If I
am thinking about my happiness I might suppose that a particular
vicious action will secure me some external good that I need to be
happy, and that I will reduce my happiness if I deny myself that
good. If I cheat, I can get the money I think I need to satisfy my
desires; and if I do not cheat, and forgo the money, then apparently
I lose something I need for happiness. An adaptive account implies
that this argument is mistaken. If I forgo an external good, I simply
^^ I translate Cobet's attractive though unnecessary emendation apKCifuBa {xp^fifScx,
codd.), which makes the connection with the Gorg. and Democritus especially clear.
^^ The difference between the Socratic and the ascetic position is overlooked by
E. R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias (Oxford 1959), on 492e3.
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need to adapt my desires to new circumstances, and I will not
necessarily forgo any happiness.
Socrates insists strongly that a virtuous person will allow nothing
to count against doing the virtuous action, no matter what the cost
may be; the only question he need ask himself is what the virtuous
action is, and his answer to that question should guide his action {Ap.
28b5-9)." His account of happiness makes this pattern of choice
quite reasonable; since the virtuous person will not see any threat to
his happiness if he pays the price of virtuous action in loss of external
goods, he need not concern himself with this price in deciding what
to do. If Socrates were to choose an external good over the virtuous
course of action, he would be choosing an action that is bad for him,
and he refuses to do this; that is why he refuses to propose an
alternative to the death penalty (Ap. 37b5-e2).^^ For the same reason
a good person cannot be harmed; no loss of external goods will
threaten his happiness.
When Socrates makes these strong claims about virtue, he is not
allowing himself a rhetorical exaggeration or an expression of un-
warranted faith. He is drawing attention to a consequence of an
adaptive account of happiness. A virtuous person can certainly suffer
the loss of external goods; such losses require him to change his
desires; but they do not threaten his happiness, since he adapts his
desires to fit the circumstances.
If this is a defensible account of Socrates' claim about virtue, one
consequence is worth noticing. It is easy to suppose that if Socrates
thinks virtue all by itself is sufficient for happiness, then he must
attribute some intrinsic value to virtue; it might be identical to
happiness, or a part of happiness whose presence is causally sufficient
for the presence of the other parts. If, however, Socrates holds an
adaptive account of happiness, he can maintain the sufficiency of
virtue without attributing any intrinsic value to it.
10. The Value of External Goods
We may hesitate to accept the sufficiency thesis because it seems to
imply that no external good is worth pursuit at all; since these alleged
goods do not promote happiness, they will not be genuine goods,
^^ This passage is appropriately stressed by Vlastos, "Happiness," p. 188, as
evidence of Socrates' belief in the "sovereignty" of virtue over other goods.
^^ In saying that it would be bad for him to choose imprisonment as a penalty
Socrates does not imply that there would be anything bad about imprisonment in
itself. For a different view of this passage see Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State
(Princeton 1984), p. 38 n.
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and so apparently not worth pursuit. This objection was raised against
the Cynics and Stoics who supported the sufficiency thesis. If we
ascribe the thesis to Socrates we may well suppose he is open to the
same objection; and if the objection seems cogent, we may hesitate
to ascribe the thesis to him.
We may hesitate still more when Socrates sometimes seems to
admit that external goods are goods. Sometimes he lists them as
goods without hesitation {Gorg. 467e4-6, Meno 78c5-dl, Lys.
218e5-2I9al). He says he would wish neither to do nor to suffer
injustice {Gorg. 469c 1). He allows the reflective pilot to wonder if he
has benefited or harmed people by saving them from drowning {Gorg.
51 Ie6-512b2). He even claims that virtue is the source of wealth
and any other goods there are {Ap. 30b2-4).^'
To admit that Socrates regards external goods as genuine goods
introduces conflict with some of his other views:
(a) He explicitly contradicts this view in the Euthydemus (281e3-5).
(b) If the sufficiency thesis is true, and if nothing is good without
contributing to happiness, then external goods cannot contrib-
ute to a virtuous person's happiness.
(c) We avoid this conflict if we say that external goods make the
virtuous person happier than he would be without them, and
that this is what makes them goods, though even without them
he would be happy. But if they are goods, then the loss of them
should harm the virtuous person, and we are in conflict with
the claim that the good person cannot be harmed.
We can remove any appearance of conflict if we deny either that
(i) Socrates makes virtue the only good, or that (ii) he accepts the
sufficiency thesis; or that (iii) he thinks the good person cannot be
harmed. Alternatively, we can understand the claims about external
goods so that they are consistent with (i)-(iii).
In the first three passages above {Gorg. 467e etc.) Socrates simply
asks his interlocutor about commonly-recognized goods, and nothing
in the argument depends on his agreeing with the interlocutor that
these are genuine goods. The passages therefore provide very weak
evidence for reinterpreting his explicit statement in (i). When he says
^' Vlastos, "Happiness," p. 208 n. 66, follows J. Burnet, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito
(Oxford 1924), ad loc, in translating "from virtue wealth and the other things
become goods" (taking ayada as predicate). This provides a less exact balance with
the previous clause ("virtue does not come to be from wealth"); and the other
translation, if I have explained it correctly, does not commit Socrates to praise of
money-making. If Burnet's translation is accepted, then this will be a passage where
Socrates allows goods whose loss does not leave a person any less happy.
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he would not wish to suffer injustice Socrates refrains from saying
he would wish not to suffer it.^^ He has no reason to wish for it,
since suffering injustice is in itself no benefit to him, and he can say
this even if not suffering injustice is no benefit to him either. ^^ These
passages do not require us to reinterpret (i).
But there is a broader reason for wanting Socrates to modify (i);
we do not want Socrates to be a Cynic, believing that he has no
reason to choose external goods over their opposites. It is worth
noticing, then, that Socrates can consistently maintain that health is
preferable to sickness without rejecting (i)-(iii). As we have seen, he
is entitled to say that if I have a feasible desire, I have reason, to
choose a means to its fulfillment, and such a means is useful to me.
To this extent Socrates could say that the means are instrumental
goods. However, it is easy to suppose that if they are instrumental
goods, I will be worse off without them; and in Socrates' view this is
false. If I lack instrumental means to satisfy a desire I will just give
up the desire, and I will be in an equally good position to achieve
my happiness.
If, then, Socrates holds an adaptive account of happiness, he has
some reason for allowing that external goods are goods (they are
sometimes instrumental means to the fulfillment of my desires) and
some reason for denying this (their presence or absence makes no
difference to my happiness). Sometimes he compromises between
these two claims by speaking in comparative terms. Just as in the
Euthydemus he says health is a greater good than sickness for a virtuous
person, he says the person who is killed unjustly is less wretched and
pitiable than the one who kills unjustly {Gorg. 469b3-6), and that
doing injustice is a greater evil than suffering it (509c6-7). We might
insist that these comparative terms do not imply that external goods
and evils are genuine goods and evils, even if the presence of one
^^ Vlastos, p. 198, and Kraut, p. 38 n., explain the passage differently.
^^ Vlastos, p. 192 f., understands Socrates in Ap. 30c6-d5 to mean that death or
imprisonment or dishonor would be some harm to him, but a much smaller harm
than doing injustice, and when Socrates says that a better man cannot suffer harm
from a worse (30c9-dl) Vlastos takes him to mean that he can suffer no major harm.
We might be forced to suppose that Socrates does not mean exactly what he says if
we had compelling reason to adopt Vlastos's view in other passages, but this passage
taken by itself must be prima facie evidence against Vlastos's view, and 1 doubt if
other passages require us to take Socrates to be speaking inexactly here. As I explain
below, even if Socrates were to admit that these external goods are goods, he would
not have to admit that their loss makes him any less happy, and therefore would not
have to admit that their loss harms him (even if he also concedes, at first sight
paradoxically, that their presence benefits him).
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and absence of the other counts as a benefit (509dl).^° But it may
be better to allow that Socrates does count external goods as genuine
goods, and then to insist that they do not make a virtuous person
any happier than he would be without them. We need not, then, be
surprised to find apparent evidence of Socrates' speaking both ways;
and we need not infer that he must reject (ii) or (iii).
1 1 . Conflicting Views on Happiness
I have tried to show that Socrates holds an adaptive account of
happiness, and that it is consistent with his recognition of reasons for
choosing external goods. But even so I doubt if he sticks consistently
to an adaptive account. Some of his remarks seem to require a
different view that seems irreconcilable with the sufficiency thesis.
In the Crito Socrates compares justice in the soul with health in
the body; he wants to show that it is not worth living with an unjust
soul, and to show that he appeals to Crito's agreement that it is not
worth living {^lcjotov) with a diseased body (47d7-e5). The same claim
about health is affirmed still more strongly in the Gorgias. There
Socrates argues that it does not benefit a person to live with his body
in bad condition, since he is bound to live badly (505a2-4).^'
These claims raise difficulties for the view that virtue is sufficient
for happiness. For apparently the virtuous person could be in bad
health; if bad health deprives him of happiness, it cannot be true
that no evil can happen to him, and his wisdom cannot make good
fortune unnecessary for his happiness.
At the same time, these claims raise wider questions about the
nature of happiness. Socrates might maintain a conception of hap-
piness as the complete fulfillment of desire, and argue that bodily
sickness inevitably frustrates desires that we cannot help having; in
that case he must admit the failure of an adaptive strategy for securing
happiness. Alternatively, he might allow that we could cease to desire
the health we cannot have, and still insist that we are unhappy because
of how we are, not because of how we feel about it. In this case
Socrates must reject the conception of happiness as complete fulfill-
ment of desire. He will have to interpret the formal criterion of
completeness and self-sufficiency as requiring fulfillment of our nature
and capacities, not just of our desires.
'° Kraut, p. 38 n., may be over-confident in claiming that "469b3-6 suggests that
someone who is unjustly killed is to be pitied" and that "at 509c6-7 he [sc. Socrates]
calls suffering injustice an evil."
" Zeyl, "Virtue," rightly cites these passages as evidence for Socrates' views on
happiness; but he does not discuss their bearing on the sufficiency thesis.
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It is worth asking whether this "Aristotelian" conception of hap-
piness, referring to fulfillment of our nature and capacities, explains
more of Socrates' claims than we have explained with the adaptive
account. The main difficulty is its failure to explain the sufficiency
thesis. Socrates appeals to the Aristotelian conception to suggest that
virtue is necessary for happiness (Cri., Gorg. locc. citt.), but it is not
easy to see how it could also support the sufficiency thesis.
In Republic I Plato highlights this difficulty by relying on the
Aristotelian conception. Socrates asks, "Will the soul achieve its
function well if it is deprived of its proper virtue, or is this impossible?"
(353el-2). Thrasymachus agrees, as Crito did, that it is impossible,
so conceding the necessity of virtue for doing well. But Socrates
infers, "It is necessary, then, for a bad soul to rule and attend badly,
and for a good one to do all these things well" (353e4-5).^^ This
abrupt and illegitimate inference from necessity to sufficiency has no
parallel in earlier dialogues; and though the Republic refers again to
the Aristotelian conception (445a5-b4), Plato does not repeat the
fallacious inference. Its presence in Book I may be a further sign of
his self-consciousness in that book. Believing (as the rest of the
Republic shows) that Socrates is right in appealing to the Aristotelian
conception, Plato sees that this will not justify the sufficiency thesis;
and so he abandons the sufficiency thesis in the rest of the Republic.
The Aristotelian conception, then, will not by itself explain Soc-
rates' major claims about virtue and happiness. To explain these
claims it is reasonable to ascribe the adaptive account to him as well.
We have no reason to believe that Socrates sees the conflict between
these two views.
12. Objections to Socrates
I have argued that an adaptive account of happiness explains the
sufficiency thesis. But this result does not imply a satisfactory defense
of virtue. Some unwelcome results of Socrates' views show what
might be wrong both with his account of happiness and with his
claims about virtue.
The problem about virtue is a special case of a general problem
in the adaptive account of happiness. This account tells us what to
do with desires that we have; satisfy the feasible ones and get rid of
the unfeasible. It does not tell us how to choose between two equally
''^ On (V KpciTTav in this argument see above, note 18. The inference (indicated
by apa, 353e4) from necessity to sufficiency is still invalid whatever we decide about
the use of tv irpotTTtiv.
110 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
feasible sets of desires. Indeed it must tell us that from the point of
view of happiness there is nothing to choose between them. If I have
the resources and capacities to be a musician, a politician or an
athlete, and I want to be one, the adaptive account of happiness does
not forbid me to try. But it does not explain why I should not want
to do nothing but lie in the sun or torture insects. The choice between
these two lives will have to depend on other grounds than happiness.
This conclusion might not surprise us. For it is not obviously false
that an admirable and a deplorable life can make different people
equally happy. But Socrates seems to think that happiness should be
our sole and sufficient guide in deciding between different ways of
life; and if happiness leaves so many questions open, it seems to be
an inadequate guide for him.
If we apply this point to Socrates' claims about virtue, we can see
where he faces questions. An adaptive account of happiness explains
the sufficiency thesis. In Socrates' view, a virtuous person has seen
that his happiness requires him to have flexible or feasible desires;
he therefore cultivates these desires and eliminates others, and so
ensures the satisfaction of his desires. He therefore ensures his
happiness, and loss of external goods is no threat to it. To this extent
Socrates can defend his claim that the virtuous person cannot be
harmed and will be happy. He will not lose any happiness by being
brave, temperate and just.
The same sort of argument shows why an opponent such as Crito
or Callicles or Thrasymachus is wrong to suppose that happiness
requires vicious action or vicious character. I will believe that happiness
requires me to be unjust or intemperate or cowardly if I want the
external goods secured by these vices, and I believe that these goods
are necessary for my happiness. But if I believe this, I must accept a
mistaken, non-adaptive account of happiness.
Socrates can argue, then, that virtue is sufficient for happiness and
vice is unnecessary for happiness. But this argument seems to give
him no reason to be virtuous rather than non-virtuous. He may
convince me that my happiness does not require me to profit at my
neighbor's expense. But I can still be happy if I am indifferent to
my neighbor's interests or unconcerned about the other people
fighting in the battle beside me. If my desires are flexible and feasible,
I can secure happiness for myself even if I refuse to do any of the
actions of the just and brave person. And if I feel greedy or malevolent
or cruel or extravagant, an adaptive account of happiness does not
prohibit the satisfaction of these inclinations.
This philosophical weakness in Socrates' position helps to explain
the historical puzzle we mentioned earlier— the sharp conflict be-
tween the views of professed Socratics about the right account of
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happiness. Socrates' adaptive account endorses neither the Cynic nor
the Cyrenaic view; but it is hard to see how Socrates can deny that
both views satisfy his account, or how he could justify preference for
one view over the other. The sharp conflict between the Socratic
schools reflects their common acceptance of a Socratic assumption,
and, as Plato (in the Philebus) and Aristotle see, we can resolve this
conflict only by rejecting the shared Socratic assumption.
Socrates, then, offers a weak defense of virtue. Though the
sufficiency thesis may seems to recommend virtue rather strongly, it
does not; for being virtuous is at best one of many possible results
of an adaptive strategy.
Even if we agree with Socrates that the happy person has no need
to violate the accepted rules of virtuous action, we need not agree
that such a person is really virtuous. Mere absence of temptation to
vicious action is not the same as a positive desire to do virtuous
action; and we might argue that the positive desire is necessary for
virtue. Further, we might argue that only the right sort of positive
desire is sufficient for virtue; perhaps the virtuous person must value
virtue and virtuous action for themselves, not simply as instrumental
means.
We might even doubt that virtuous lives will normally be a subset
of happy lives. Will a just person not desire to promote other people's
good, and will his desire, in unfavorable conditions, not be frustrated?
It looks as though a virtuous person will be less happy, according to
Socrates' conception of happiness, than someone who is wrongly
indifferent to the results of virtuous action.
For these reasons we might doubt if Socrates has an adequate
defense of virtue. If he has no answer to our objections, it does not
follow that he is wrong. It may be our estimate of virtue that is
wrong. But the objections should at least encourage us to reconsider
Socrates' case. Especially they should encourage us to reconsider the
adaptive account of happiness.
At this point we might argue that if the adaptive account of
happiness leaves Socrates open to such objections, we have good
reason for doubting that he accepts it. And indeed this would be a
good reason, if we also had good reason to believe that Socrates both
sees these objections and sees their bearing on his account of happiness.
But we have no good reason to believe either of these things.
13. Plato's Reply to Socrates
We may now return to the beginning of the argument, and the
conflict between Republic I and the rest of the Republic. I have argued
for these conclusions:
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1. Socrates believes the sufficiency thesis maintained in Republic I.
2. He believes it because he accepts an adaptive account of happiness.
3. Such a conception makes just lives at best a proper subset of happy
lives.
I now suggest a further conclusion:
4. Plato rejects the sufficiency thesis because he rejects the adaptive
account of happiness.
Plato sees that it is reasonable to maintain an apparently weaker
claim about virtue to avoid the price that must be paid for Socrates'
stronger claim. The most plausible defense of the sufficiency thesis
rests on an adaptive account of happiness. Once an adaptive account
is rejected, the sufficiency thesis must be rejected; and Plato defends
instead the comparative claim about virtue and vice.^^
To show that Plato rejects an adaptive account of happiness, we
need to understand the implicit criteria and conception assumed in
the Republic. In particular we need to understand Plato's reasons for
claiming that the people with unjust and disordered souls must all
be unhappy. If we examine these reasons, we will see that Plato's
claims about unjust people rest on an account of happiness that is
not purely adaptive.
I will not defend this suggestion here. I have simply suggested
why Plato might have good reasons for rejecting Socrates' sufficiency
thesis. The thesis should be rejected not simply because it is counter-
intuitive, but also because it rests on an account of happiness that is
more deeply in error. When we see that Socrates' account of happiness
leads him into error, we learn an important Socratic lesson that
Socrates apparently has not learned himself; we need a clearer account
of what happiness is supposed to be, and what would be a plausible
candidate for happiness. This is the lesson that Plato and Aristotle
learn, to different degrees. Once they examine happiness more
carefully, they abandon Socrates' sufficiency thesis.'*
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*^ Plato's rejection of the Socratic Paradox gives him a further reason for rejecting
Socrates' account of happiness (see note 10), though it would not by itselfjustify him
in rejecting the conception of happiness as fulfillment of desires.
''' An earlier version of this paper was read to the Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy in December 1984, and benefited from questions raised on that occasion.
Questions from audiences at Colgate University and at William and Mary College,
especially from Daniel Little, helped me to improve a still earlier version. I have also
benefited from criticisms by Gail Fine, and from a very helpful correspondence with
Gregory Vlastos. I am especially indebted to the papers by Vlastos and Zeyl cited
above.
